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Abstract
A number of studies have found little economic impact of board gender diversity on rm
performance. We return to this issue in the context of large European rms. Our contribution
is twofold. First, using information on the gender of CEOs children as a source of exogenous
variation in female director appointments, we demonstrate a robust positive e¤ect of female
board representation on rm performance. Second, while previous work has considered female
representation broadly, we focus on membership of board committees as a proxy for active
involvement in corporate governance. We demonstrate economically meaningful positive e¤ects
on performance of female representation on board committees. Our evidence is supportive of
an economic rationale for increased female representation on corporate boards.
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There is an increasing focus on gender diversity on executive boards. While the share of female
employment in large rms has increased dramatically in the United States and the European Union,
this has not been reected in the gender composition of executive boards (Black and Juhn, 2000;
Bertrand and Hallock, 2001). Growing concerns about gender equality have led to a large number of
regulations across the world that aim to increase female representation on corporate boards. Board
gender diversity has also become an important criterion for institutional investment and listings
by such socially responsible indices as the FTSE4Good Index and the Domini 400 Social Index
(Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Proposals to increase the proportion of female directors are premised
upon the idea that this will be benecial for governance, and ultimately, rm performance.
A complication with these initiatives is that the focus on representation may miss the actual
integration of female directors into rm governance. This is, perhaps, reected in the lack of
consistent evidence on the performance-impact of female representation on corporate boards. The
economic implications of board gender diversity may be ambiguous if decisions to increase female
representation on boards are, in part, driven by social and political pressures that raise concerns
regarding token representation. For instance, using a sample of US rms, Adams and Ferreira
(2009) in fact nd a negative impact of having females on the board on rm performance, despite
better attendance records and more e¤ective monitoring in rms with more gender-balanced boards.
While for the UK, Gregory-Smith, Main and OReilly (2014) nd no evidence that the gender
composition of the board a¤ects rm performance. Whilst the e¤ect on the rm performance of
board gender diversity has been extensively researched, recent work highlights the importance of
board committees in the functioning of the board (Adams, 2003; Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach,
20010; Guo and Masulis, 2015). This is important because boards do most of their work through
committees, and we know much less about how committee composition a¤ects performance than
we know about the e¤ects of board composition. Female representation on committees is likely to
be a more e¤ective measure of board gender diversity, and likely to have a more direct e¤ect on
rm performance. While regulatory and institutional pressures may lead to the appointment of
female directors on the board, they do not ensure the participation of appointed female directors
in the governance mechanism. Therefore, appointment to committees reects integration of female
directors in the governance mechanism. Diverse boards can benet from better matching of skills
to functions, and appointment of female directors to decision-making committees can be a source
of competitive advantage.
Against this backdrop, the objective of this paper is to provide new evidence on the performance
impact of female director appointment to board committees. To this end, we use data from large
publicly listed European rms. Most of the existing studies on the impact on the rm performance
of gender-diverse boards are based on institutional settings where female representation is, in e¤ect,
binary. This is an important point as estimates derived from these settings e¤ectively provide the
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e¤ect of appointing the rst female director (OReilly and Main, 2012; Torchia, Calabr¼o, and Huse,
2011). It is di¢ cult to extrapolate the e¤ect of moving towards an equal gender representation
from these settings where the proportion of female directors in the median rm is zero. Our setting
is advantageous in this respect due to wider variation in female board representation in many
European countries when compared to the US and the UK. In our setting, over 50% of our sample
rms have more than one female director, while about 10% of boards are gender-balanced. This,
we argue, allows us to more informatively address this issue.
We examine the impact on rm performance of female directors on the board and on committees.
This, we argue, allows us to examine the impact of female directors on rm performance when they
are in a greater position to inuence the governance mechanism. We focus on assignments to the
nomination, audit, and compensation committees. We focus on these three committees because
they are consistently present across all rms, and cover the three core functions of the board
(Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Guo and Masulis, 2015). We construct a measure of the proportion
of female directors on the three committees taken together and examine the e¤ect of that on rm
performance. While studying the performance impact of board gender diversity, it is important to
control for the endogenous appointment of female directors. In addition to controlling for a range
of rm and board characteristics, we include rm and year xed e¤ects to mitigate time-invariant
omitted variable bias.
A remaining concern is what determines changes in representation. To address this, we use
two-stage least squares estimation to control for time-varying unobservables. It is well known
that CEOs inuence the process of director appointments to committees and to boards in general
(Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2014). We instrument the appointment
of female directors using information on the gender-composition of the CEOs children as a source
of exogenous variation. There is evidence that the gender composition of children a¤ects parental
preferences (Washington, 2008; Cronqvist and Yu, 2017). The premise of our identication strategy
is that male CEOs who parent a daughter are more likely to appoint female directors to boards and
committees, but the gender of the CEOschildren should not directly a¤ect rm performance. We
perform an array of tests aimed at examining the relevance of the instrument and the plausibility
of the exclusion restriction.
We nd that whilst female representation on corporate boards has a modest impact on perfor-
mance, the e¤ect of female representation on board committees is economically more meaningful.
A one standard deviation increase in the proportion of female directors on committees increases
ROA by 0.06 of a standard deviation. In comparison, a one standard deviation increase in female
board representation increases ROA by 0.026 of a standard deviation. In other words, an addition
of each female director on the board (and committees) is associated with an approximate 0.1%
(0.4%) increase in ROA. In comparison, a one standard deviation increase in female committee
(board) representation improves market-to-book ratio by 0.05 (0.11) of a standard deviation. The
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economic magnitude of the gender e¤ects are comparable to the e¤ect of industry-specic expertise
of directors. For example, Dass, Kini, Nanda, and Onal (2014) report that a one standard deviation
increase in the proportion of directors with specic industry expertise increases rm performance
by 0.14 of a standard deviation.
We attempt to reconcile the above results with previous evidence. We take a sample of UK
rms in our data to reestimate our baseline specications. The proportion of female directors on
the board has no statistically signicant association with the rm performance for UK rms, but
the results of committee membership again reveal a positive impact on rm performance.
These results are timely considering the recent regulatory requirements for mandatory female
representation on the boards of European rms. These range from the advisory requirements in
the U.K., Netherlands, and Spain, the rm disclosure of their gender diversity policy in board
recruitment in the US, through to enforced gender quotas in Germany, France, and Norway (Higgs,
2003; Davies, 2011). In particular, even though the estimated performance e¤ects are modest, our
results support the economic premise for gender diverse corporate boards.
In addition, our results contribute to a few di¤erent strands of research. First, it is related to
the literature on diversity on corporate boards. Although a large empirical literature exists on the
e¤ects of board gender diversity, the endogenous appointment of female directors remains a major
concern in interpreting the causal implications in the current literature. The prior literature has
examined the performance e¤ect of board gender diversity and found zero or negative association
between female representation and rm performance (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Gregory-Smith et
al., 2014). These papers use a measure of the female connectedness of a board as an instrumental
variable. In contrast, our identication strategy relies on the variation of the gender-composition
of the CEOs children. This we argue is a better measure of exogenous variation to female director
appointment than the network-based measure. Larger rms tend to have better-connected boards,
and as such the measure of female connectedness of the board is likely to be associated with larger
rms (Larcker, So, and Wang, 2013).
Second, our paper contributes to the burgeoning literature on board committees. In this litera-
ture, conventional wisdom is that boards do most of their work in committees (Adams, Hermalin,
and Weisbach, 2010). Guo and Masulis (2015) show that nomination committee independence leads
to more rigorous monitoring of the CEO. Defond et al. (2005) report a positive market reaction
to the matching of director skills to committee appointments. However, a key distinction of our
paper is that we focus on the gender composition of three important board committees, and how
that a¤ects rm performance.
Third, we contribute to the literature on the functioning of corporate boards. Specically, we
focus on the gender, education, and experience of individual directors as determinants of committee
appointments. Adams (2003) argue that the set of committees indicate the important functions
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of a board. Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach (2013) analyze minutes of board committee meetings of
Israeli rms to examine the relative time devoted by the board to managerial and supervisory roles.
We contribute by providing evidence on how education, experience, and gender of directors a¤ect
the likelihood of appointment to board committees.
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows: section 2 reviews relevant literature on the gender
composition of corporate boards, section 3 introduces the sample and the estimation methods
employed for the analysis, section 4 presents the results and section 5 concludes.
2 Background and Existing Evidence
2.1 FEMALEREPRESENTATIONONBOARDSANDFIRMPERFORMANCE
The existing evidence on board composition in the corporate governance and management literature
focuses primarily on the equity and the productivity impacts of female representation. Arguments
in favour of increased representation of women on corporate boards traditionally stem from concerns
about discrimination and moral justice. A key point of contention is the upward trend in female
participation in the labour force (Black and Juhn, 2000) and the fact that while female labour
force participation tripled between 1992-1997, they continue to represent a very small proportion of
executive positions (Bertrand and Hallock, 2001). The apparent incongruence of female represen-
tation on boards and female representation in the labour force could be due to supply constraints,
discrimination, or a combination of both. Disentangling these channels is empirically di¢ cult, in
part because applications for directorships are not publicly observed. Powell and Buttereld (1994)
argue that discriminatory practices hinder the career progression of equally qualied women on to
corporate boards. Farrell and Hersch (2005), and Gregory-Smith et al. (2014) examine the appoint-
ment of new directors and nd that the incidence of female appointments is signicantly higher
if the immediate predecessor was a female. Such evidence of a non-neutral director appointment
process ties in with the notion of tokenism. If the only time female directors are appointed is to
replace outgoing female directors, then, in the absence of regulations, the low fraction of female
directors on corporate boards will persist over time.1
There are two broad channels through which increased female representation is likely to inuence
rm performance. The rst channel is through (reductions in) discrimination. If existing low levels
of female representation reect discriminatory gender bias in director appointments this will likely
leave rms with a competitive disadvantage. This reects e¢ ciency losses due to discrimination in
1There are two ways to be an elected director for the rst time: imposedand nominated. Boards can appoint
a director within a nancial year and in the following annual shareholders meeting this director is nominated for
re-election; or the board rst nominates the director in the proxy statement, and the director gets voted in by all the
shareholders in the annual meeting. Imposed directors are the more common mode of rst appointments.
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a competitive setting (Becker, 1957). In this case, replacing less able male directors with relatively
more able, more productive, female directors should increase rm performance. In the presence
of statistical gender discrimination in the labour force, female directors are likely to be drawn
from the higher end of the ability distribution of females. Therefore appointing these high ability
individuals can improve rm performance. The second channel is through benets from diversity.
If diverse teams outperform homogenous teams (Kahane, Longley, and Simmons, 2013) increased
female representation may lead to better rm performance in ways unrelated to discrimination.
These gains are potentially bourne from a greater diversity of views in team and group decision
making contexts. Kim and Starks (2017) show that the addition of female directors diversify the
set of boardsexpertise. Again, disentangling these channels is di¢ cult. A more gender diverse
board may be associated with improved decision making, more e¢ cient monitoring, as well as the
displacement of less able male directors (see Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003).
In practice, the existing literature focuses primarily on the overall e¤ect of female representation
on rm performance. Empirical evidence suggests that board composition has no signicant e¤ect
on rm performance and even that the e¤ect of board gender diversity on rm performance can be
negative (Larcker, et al. 2007; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Ahern and Dittmar, 2012; Gregory-Smith
et al. 2014). Gul, Srinidhi, and Ng (2011) nd that female representation on boards improves stock
price informativeness through increased public disclosure. These results are typically based on
either the study of boards with only one female director or mandatory enforcement of regulations
on female board representation. Thus, these results could capture the e¤ect of tokenism, rather
than the causal impact, of female representation on rm performance.
The majority of studies on female representation on corporate boards examine US rms (Adams
and Ferreira, 2009; Gul, Srinidhi, and Ng, 2011; Torchia et al. 2011). Little empirical evidence
exists from European nations [see Gregory-Smith et al. (2014) for the UK and Ahern and Dittmar
(2012), Eckbo, Nygaard and Thorburn (2016), Dale-Olsen et al. (2016) for Norway]. European
rms di¤er from US rms in that a larger proportion are family-controlled in Europe, a lower
prevalence of dual-class shareholding, and the existence of tiered boards (Ferreira and Kirchmaier,
2012; Faccio and Lang, 2002). Christiansen, Lin, Perreira, Topalova, and Turk (2016) provide the
only evidence on gender diversity in senior corporate positions across European countries. Using
data from over 2 million European rms for the year 2013, they nd a positive association between
gender diversity in senior positions and rm performance. The positive association is stronger in
sectors with a more feminised workforce, and in knowledge-intensive sectors.
2.2 BOARD COMMITTEES, MONITORING, AND FEMALE DIRECTORS
Boards of directors have the duciary responsibility of acting on behalf of the shareholders (Fama
and Jensen, 1983). In practice, the board delegates most of the responsibilities to committees
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(Adams, 2003; Guo and Masulis, 2015). Some of these committees are formed ad-hoc for a specic
task, whilst standing committees are delegated with specic, narrowly dened functions. Important
decisions of the boards are initiated in these committees, and there is evidence that delegation of
responsibilities to committees facilitates e¤ective governance (Billmoria and Piderit, 1994; Adams,
2003). The recommendations of these committees are placed before the full board for deliberation
(Klein, 1998). The number and functions of these committees vary across rms, and roles are
sometimes combined. For instance, all rms in the S&P 500 sample have at least one standing
committee, with the average rm having three committees. The most common among these com-
mittees are the audit committee, the nomination committee, and the compensation committee. The
audit committee focuses on the appointment of independent auditors and management of internal
nancial performance, the nomination committee recommends the appointment of new directors to
the board, and the compensation committee deals with compensation and benets for executives.
Directors can directly inuence CEO pay, the nomination of new directors, quality of nancial
reporting, etc. if they serve on smaller groups with primary responsibilities of these tasks (Adams,
Hermalin, and Weisbach, 2010). In our sample, the mean tenure of directors on these committees
is 4.8 years.
Recent evidence suggests that the composition of board committees is important for gover-
nance. For example, Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) nd that when the CEO is on the nomination
committee, rms appoint fewer independent directors. Guo and Masulis (2015) show that rms
with fully independent nomination committees have a higher sensitivity of forced CEO turnover
to rm performance, and nomination committee independence is important even when rms have
independent boards. In contrast, Anderson and Bizjak (2003) nd that compensation committee
independence and the presence of CEO on the compensation committee does not a¤ect executive
compensation, while committee independence does a¤ect the timing of earnings announcement
(Michaely, Rubin, and Vedrashko, 2014).
Despite the importance of board committees to corporate governance, the mechanisms of how
individual directors are appointed to the board committees is not well understood. There are no
regulatory guidelines on the number, and composition of these committees. Whilst there is evidence
that director expertise matters (Güner, Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Goldman, Rocholl, and So,
2009; Dass et al., 2014), there is limited evidence on the committee assignment of directors with
relevant expertise. Defond et al. (2005) nd a positive market reaction to the appointment to audit
committees of outside directors with nancial expertise.
If the appointment of female directors is merely a compliance requirement, then female direc-
tors will be less likely to be appointed to committees if not for obvious benets to the functioning
of these committees. Adams and Ferreira (2009) nd that female directors in US rms are 3.5
percentage points more likely to be appointed to at least one of the board committees and that the
female directors are over-represented in monitoring related committees but under-represented in
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compensation committees. Through their appointment on these committees, female directors can
inuence the governance mechanism more directly. Whilst the e¤ect of female board representa-
tion on rm performance is examined in economic literature, the evidence on the e¤ect of female
representation on the board committees is scarce.
3 Data
3.1 DATA SOURCE
The primary database used in the analysis is BoardEx. This provides information on board com-
position and director networks for listed European rms. We use a sample of EuroTop 100 rms for
the period 2004-2015.2 EuroTop 100 is the largest rms, in terms of market capitalisation, listed in
any of stock exchanges of the European Union. Firms that appear at least once in the EuroTop 100
are followed for the full sample period as long as they remain listed. The sample rms are drawn
from eleven western European countries: Belgium (5), Denmark (7), France (24), Germany (21),
Italy (10), Netherlands (13), Norway (3), Spain (11), Sweden (4), Switzerland (14), and the United
Kingdom (30).3 One potential concern is that the results with EuroTop 100 rms can be idiosyn-
cratic, and not generalizable. Our choice of sample is driven by the completeness of the information
set required for the empirical analysis. In addition, and as discussed later, the instrumental variable
in our sample is created using a news-based algorithm, which is heavily weighted towards larger
rms. We address this concern in two ways. First, we use an enhanced sample of rms listed in
the major European indices in the period 2004-2015.4 We use this enhanced sample to test the
robustness of our baseline results. Second, in appendix II we provide a comparison of EuroTop
100 rms with that of FTSEurorst 300 (index of 300 largest European rms ranked by market
capitalisation), FTSE 350 (index of 350 largest rms listed in UK, by market capitalisation), and
S&P 500 (index of 500 largest US rms, by market capitalisation). The distribution of size, net
market capitalisation, dividend yield, weight of the largest and top 10 holdings of the constituents
of EuroTop 100 is similar to that of S&P 500, and to a lesser extent to the other U.K. comparator.
These mitigate the concerns that our results could be an artefact of the sample selection.
We use information on individual directors on the boards of these rms. We drop observations
on individual directors observed in only one period in a given rm. We augment this database
2We choose this sample period because of better coverage and consistency of BoardEx data.
3Some European countries have recently introduced legislative quotas on board gender diversity. This includes
Italy (e¤ective 2015), France (e¤ective 2017), Germany (e¤ective 2016), Belgium (e¤ective 2017), and advisory targets
in Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom. All these legislations come into e¤ect at the end of our sample period.
The only legislation that overlaps with our sample period is Norway (e¤ective 2008). Our results are robust to the
exclusion of Norwegian rms from the sample.
4Firms listed in CAC 40 (France), FTSE 100 (UK), DAX 40 (Germany), BEL-20 (Belgium), OMX (Sweden,
Finland), FTSE MIB (Italy), AEX (Netherlands), PSI-20 (Portugal), MDAX (Spain), and SMI (Switzerland) are
included in the enhanced sample.
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with a range of nancial performance measures from Datastream. Firms with unavailable nancial
performance data were excluded. The nal sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 177 rms with
16,647 director-year observations. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for selected rm, board
and individual director characteristics.
[Insert Table 1 near here]
In further extensions, we di¤erentiate between samples of UK-rms, and non-UK European
rms, which allows us to compare our ndings with respect to the evidence from UK rms. On
average, UK rms are comparable in size to European rms, but with lower protability and lower
volatility of stock prices.
3.2 KEY VARIABLES AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
We only focus on non-executive independent female directors of whom females constitute 2,618
or 14.26% of the sample. We use both de-jure and de-facto measures of female representation on
corporate boards. First, we use Any Female, which is a binary indicator of the presence of at least
one female board member in a given rm-year. As a point of comparison, while only 25% of the
sample rms in Adams and Ferreira (2009) have more than one female director, over 50% of our
sample rms have more than one female director.
This is the commonly used measure of female director appointments and is also the one used in
compliance guidelines. The Proportion of Female Directors on Board is the ratio of female directors
to total directors. An average board in our sample has 18.68% female representation, compared
with 8.5% in the US sample (Adams and Ferreira, 2009) and 5% in the UK sample (Gregory-Smith
et al., 2014).
However, these above measures do not necessarily reect the integration of female directors in
the governance mechanism. We introduce a de-facto measure of female representation in gover-
nance: Proportion of Female in Committees which is the ratio of the combined number of female
directors on three key committees (audit committee, nomination committee, and compensation
committee) to the total number of directors on these committees.5 A priori, directors who sits on
one or more of these committees are more likely to inuence the governance mechanism through her
inuence on the proposals and decisions of these committees. The proportion of female directors
on the three key committees is an important variable for our empirical strategy as it measures
the extent to which female directors are integrated into the governance mechanism of the rm. A
5The three committees we consider covers the three basic functions of the board, and are consistently present in
all sample rms. There are other standing committees like environment committee, risk committee, etc. which are
present less systematically.
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total of 1,227 or 46.8% of the female directors in our sample are members of at least one of the
three governance committees.6 The proportional representation of female directors on committees
is greater than that on the board. Conditional of being on the board, female directors of European
rms have an even chance of being on at least one committee.
In table 2, we compare rm-year and board-year characteristics for rms with at least one
female director and rms without a female director. Firms with at least one female director are on
average larger, perform better in terms of return on assets, and have higher stock price volatility.
These ndings suggest that female representation on corporate boards is associated with rm
characteristics and performance outcomes.
[Insert Table 2 near here]
The comparison of rms with and without female directors suggests that rm characteristics
can inuence female representation on corporate boards. In our subsequent empirical analysis, we
include a set of covariates such as rm size, protability, and stock-price volatility to control for
di¤erences in rm characteristics. The association between board gender diversity and performance
may vary with the choice of rm performance measure (Erhardt, et al. 2003; Smith et al. 2006).
The primary measure of rm performance for our analysis is Return on Assets (ROA). To test the
robustness of our results, we use other standard measures of performance: Tobins q approximated
by market-to-book value ratio (MTBV) and Total Shareholders Return (TSR). We control for risk
in a rms operational environment using the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the
previous 12-month period. The natural logarithm of annual sales is used to control for rm size.7
We also include standard controls for board characteristics: board size and board independence
(percentage of independent directors on the board).8
The appointment of individual directors to boards, and assignment to committees, as well as
the directorsimpact on rm performance, could be driven by the skills and experience. Using in-
formation available from BoardEx, we construct identiers for directors with Ph.Ds and Chartered
Financial Accountants (CFA), and directors with previous experience in committees. 9% of direc-
tors have Ph.Ds, 11% have CFA, and 12.5% of all directors have previous experience of being on
committees within the sample of EuroTop 100 rms. We aggregate these measures at a rm-year
level.9
6 In our data, 14.22% of female directors are assigned to committees in the UK, and 12.68% in the US. The
comparable gures are 8.87% for the US (Adams and Ferreira, 2009) and 8.19% for the UK (Gregory-Smith, et al,
2014).
7We check the robustness of our results to other measures of rm performance and rm size.
8 In the case of two-tier boards, board size is the linear summation of the number of directors on both the
management and the supervisory board. The denition of independent director varies marginally across countries.
However, the basic premise for a director to be considered independent is that she will not be a current or a former
employee, a relative of a sitting executive, or has business relations with the rm.
9We test the robustness of the director experience measure by including the experience of committee membership
in all quoted boards covered by BoardEx. The results are qualitatively similar.
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As described in more details in the next section, we use information on the gender composition
of CEOs children as a measure of exogenous variation in female director appointments. The
data on CEO children are collected from BoardEx World of CEOs Beta, which provides detailed
biographies of CEOs and other executives of listed rms in Europe, North America, and other
parts of the world. We augment this information with publicly available sources like Reuters, the
Financial Times, Wikipedia, etc. Using a combination of the CEOsrst names, second names,
rm names, and keywords like "daughters", "children", "family", "marriage", etc. we search the
internet for information on the CEOschildren. From these sources, we were able to identify the
gender of the children for 255 of 286 unique CEOs in our data.10 The average CEO in our sample
has 2.27 children and 1.14 daughters. This is comparable to the average family size of 2.3 across 28
European Union member states (Eurostat, 2015). The distribution of CEO children and daughters
is presented in table 3. Of all the CEOs, 97.3% have at least one children, and of that 62.12% have
at least one daughter.11 Daughters comprise 49.6% of all CEO children, which is consistent with
the gender ratio of 1.01 across the European Union (Eurostat, 2015).
[Insert Table 3 near here]
4 Empirical strategy
Our initial approach is to estimate variants of the following model which aims to provide evidence
on the association between female participation and rm performance:
yit = Fit 1 + Zit 1 + fi + ht + "it (1)
where yit is a measure of rm performance,  captures the strength of association of female board
representation F , and Z is a vector of rm characteristics.12 Firm characteristics, performance, and
female board representation can be co-determined. Therefore, all independent variables, including
the measure of female representation on the board, are lagged by one period. fi and ht represent
rm and year xed e¤ects, respectively.
Recent evidence suggests that boards do most of their work through committees. It is therefore
plausible that directors assigned to committees are better placed to inuence board governance and
10The proportion of CEO for whom we have information on the children is higher than that of Cronqvist and Yu
(2016). This is presumably because they use a sample of S&P 500 rms, whereas we focus on only the largest 100
rms, CEOs of which are more visible in the media.
11This number is comparable with Cronqvist and Yu (2017) who report that about 4% of US CEOs have no
children. Washington (2008) reports average family size over 2 for US senators with 14% having no children.
12Existing studies use either contemporaneous female representation (Adams and Ferreira, 2009) or lagged measures
(Gregory-Smith, et al. 2014). We choose to use lagged measures (one period) but stress that results are very similar
if we use contemporaneous measures. These estimates are available upon request.
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ultimately rm performance. With this in mind, we seek to examine whether the appointment of
female directors to board committees is associated with better rm performance. We investigate
the impact of female representation on committees to rm performance:
yit = Cit 1 + Zit 1 + fi + ht + it (2)
where yit is a measure of rm performance, Cit 1 is the proportion of female directors on audit,
nomination and compensation committees combined, and Z is a vector of rm characteristics. The
estimate on  reects the impact of female directors on rm performance, conditional on their being
appointed on the committees. Our main estimates focus on the proportions of the board and the
committees that are female, but in the subsequent analysis we also examine the e¤ect of having at
least one female on the board, and three or more female directors on the board and greater than
50% of the committees being female.
4.1 IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY
A key challenge to causal interpretation is that there may be omitted unobservable characteristics
that simultaneously a¤ect rm performance and the appointment of female directors, to both the
board and to committees. We adopt a number of approaches to this problem. First, we use rm
xed e¤ects to control for any time-invariant rm characteristics that may inuence both underlying
protability and the likelihood of appointing female directors. Doing so provides within rm e¤ects
of changes in gender diversity on rm performance. An additional concern may be that there may
be time-varying factors that inuence both changes in board gender diversity and rm protability.
This leads us to, in addition, pursue an instrumental variables strategy which takes the form of a
2SLS analogue of equations (1) and (2).
Potential candidates for valid instruments are few. We rely on two established results. First, it is
well known that CEOs inuence the process of director appointments to committees, and to boards
in general (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2014). Second, it has been
shown that child gender a¤ects parental preferences for a range of social and economic outcomes
(Warner and Steel, 1999; Washington, 2008; Oswald and Powdthavee, 2010). In essence, parenting
a daughter shapes the fathers identity (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Chen and Li, 2009). More
closely related to our work Cronqvist and Yu (2017) shows for a sample of US rms that corporate
social responsibility expenses are higher for rms whose CEOs parent a daughter. We extend this
strand of the literature and use information on the gender composition of CEOs children as a
predictor of appointment of female directors on boards, and assignment to committees.
The underlying identifying assumption in this literature is that nature randomly allocates childs
gender conditional on parental characteristics. In turn, fathers who parent both daughters and sons
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are shown to have increased sympathy towards feminist issues, compared to fathers who parent only
sons (Warner, 1991). We rely on this, in combination with the observation that only 1.3% of our
sample rms have a female CEO. This leads us to instrument female board/committee membership
using the gender of the CEOs children. The identication strategy is premised on the assumption
that parenting a female child makes the CEO more likely to appoint a female director, but the
gender of the child does not inuence rm performance directly.
It is important to note that we use the "treatment" of a female child as our instrumental variable
and not the "dosage", i.e. our IV is a binary variable of having at least one female child and not
the proportion of female children.13 Some studies in political economy and the management ethics
literature have used the gender composition of children, whilst others have used a binary indicator
for daughter (Washington, 2008; Cronqvist and Yu, 2017). We adopt the latter approach because
the agents could choose a fertility stopping rule that will impact upon the gender composition of
the children. In such a case there will be a correlation between the number of children and the
preference of the parents for one particular gender, which will render the instrument invalid (Clark,
2000).
We specify an indicator CEO daughter, which equals 1 if the CEO has a daughter, or 0 otherwise.
The e¤ect of child gender on the preferences can di¤er by parents gender (Washington, 2008).
Therefore, we only include male CEOs who parent a daughter. The average age of the sample
CEOs is 58 years. As a result, family formation decisions are likely to have occurred before their
tenure. This leads identication to be generated from CEO turnover within the sample period,
where a CEO who parents a daughter is replaced by a CEO who does not parent a daughter (and
vice-versa). Of the 149 events of CEO turnover in our sample period, there are 112 such cases.
Given that all models include rm xed e¤ects, identication is generated from CEO turnover in the
sample period. In table 4 we compare characteristics of rms with CEOs who parent a daughter,
and rms with CEOs who do not parent a daughter. There seems to be no signicant di¤erence
in the means of rm characteristics and CEO turnover likelihood, except the three measures of
female representation discussed above. This supports our hypothesis that rms with CEOs who
have daughters appoint more female directors.
[Insert Table 4 near here]
13We rely on the CEOs not practicing sex-selective abortions, however, the possibility of sex-selective adoption
remains. Another possible source of attenuation bias is that CEOs may maintain secrecy over a subset of their
children, particularly if they are conceived out of wedlock. Finally, CEOs may have children from multiple marriages,
or marriages with stepchildren, for which the data is not reliable.
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5 Results and analysis
5.1 FEMALE REPRESENTATION, COMMITTEES, AND FIRM PERFOR-
MANCE
Table 5 presents estimates of the e¤ect of gender diversity on rm protability. Our baseline
measures of rm performance and female representation are the return on assets (ROA) and the
Proportion of Female Directors on Board. We report OLS estimates, xed e¤ects estimate that
aim to hold time-invariant rm characteristics constant, and nally, IV estimates where rm xed
e¤ects are also included. What is the clear from these estimates it that increased gender diversity
is clearly related to higher rm protability in our setting. The ordinary least squares estimates
are positive and statistically signicant. These are reduced substantially once rm xed e¤ects
are included. Nonetheless, they remain statistically di¤erent from zero and of an economically
meaningful magnitude, a one standard deviation increase in gender diversity increases ROA by
0.026 of a standard deviation.14 These results are presented in panel A of table 5.
A remaining concern is that these estimates may still be subject to bias as a result of time-
varying, unobserved, inuences on rm protability and gender diversity. To address this, we
instrument gender diversity using the presence of a CEO with at least one daughter as described
in the previous section. The rst stage estimates are presented in appendix C. Controlling for
rm characteristics, board characteristics, and director education and experience this instrument
is positively, and statistically signicantly associated with the female director appointments on
boards. The appointment of a CEO with a daughter leads to an approximate doubling in female
representation on boards and committees. The instrument clearly passes standard thresholds for
weak instruments (F-Stat = 21.76), as reported in columns 3 and 6 of table 5. While this estimation
strategy does a¤ect the magnitude of the gender diversity e¤ect on rm protability, it remains
positive and statistically signicant. The parameter estimate moves back in the direction of the
OLS estimates, the magnitude of the e¤ect is just over a half of that reported in column 1 of panel
A.
[Insert Table 5 near here]
In summary, our results suggest that gender-diverse corporate boards are associated with better
rm performance, but the association is smaller after controlling for across rm variations. The
statistically signicant positive association persists after attempting to control for the potential en-
dogeneity of the appointment of female directors. However, the economic e¤ect of the performance
gains from female representation on corporate boards is modest.
14The economic impact is arrived at by multiplying the standard deviation of the proportion of female directors
(14.5) with the coe¢ cient on %Female on Boardt 1 from Column 3 of Table 5 (0.011), and dividing the product by
the standard deviation of the ROA (6.108).
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We now examine whether the earlier e¤ects of gender board diversity on rm protability are
altered when we focus on female representation on committees. To provide some initial information
appendix D provides descriptive evidence on the determinants of committee membership. These are
estimates from linear probability models of the likelihood of a director being on any of the three key
committees (audit, nomination, and compensation), and each separately. Overall, female directors
are more likely to be assigned to any of the three committees. This hides some heterogeneity
insofar as they are more likely to be on the audit committee and less likely to be on the nomination
committee. We introduce controls for educational qualications and previous experience and allow
these to vary by gender. Directors with CFA and previous committee experience are more likely
to be assigned to committees. Female directors with previous committee experience additionally
increase the likelihood of committee assignment, over and above the unconditional gender e¤ect.
With this as background, we now examine whether the earlier e¤ects of gender board diversity
on rm protability are altered when we focus on female representation on committees. Panel B
of table 5 presents the estimates related to this issue. In columns 1 and 2, we report the ordinary
least squares (OLS) and rm xed-e¤ects estimates (FE) of the e¤ect of the proportion of female
directors on committees on ROA. We follow this again with 2-stage least square instrumental
variable (IV) estimates analogous to those presented for the earlier board level estimates in column
(3).
In all the specications, the proportion of female directors on key committees has a positive and
statistically signicant e¤ect on rm performance. The e¤ect of gender diversity on committees on
rm performance is of an order of magnitude larger than those reported earlier at the board level.
For the estimates with rm xed e¤ects, this is 3 times larger, while for the IV estimates this is just
under twice as large. Focusing on this latter estimates, this suggests a substantial increase in rm
protability resulting from increased female participation in rm governance and decision making.
To quantify this, a one standard deviation increase in the proportion of females in committees
increases ROA by 0.06 of a standard deviation.
We mount a similar analysis using MTBV as the dependent variable, the results of which are
presented in table 6. Similar to the previous analysis, we nd that the e¤ect of female representation
in committees is stronger than board representation. The economic e¤ect of female representation
onMTBV are larger compared to the e¤ect on ROA. A one standard deviation increase in females
on committees (board) increase MTBV by 0.11 (0.05) of a standard deviation. These e¤ects are
comparable to the e¤ect of directors expertise reported by Dass et al. (2014). One possible
explanation for the stronger e¤ect of female representation on MTBV compared to ROA is that
investors perception of the expected protability of the rm improves with the appointment of
female directors.
[Insert Table 6 near here]
15
Our general nding is that the integration of female directors in the functioning of the boards
leads to greater performance gains from board diversity. Existing studies estimate only the impact
of female representation (but not participation), which could partially explain their ndings of
zero or negative impact on the rm performance of female board representation. The impact of
female committee representation on rm performance is a novel result, highlighting the possible
tokenism in female director appointments on boards. Although we nd a positive and statistically
signicant association of female representation and rm performance, it is important to note that
the performance e¤ect is still modest. A one standard deviation change in female representation
is equivalent to adding two female directors on the board, and the associated change in ROA is
about 0.2%. Despite the modest performance e¤ects, these results provide an economic rationale
for female appointments, particularly to committees where they can inuence governance.15
5.2 ADDITIONAL RESULTS AND ROBUSTNESS
5.2.1 Threats to identication
We run a series of robustness tests for our instrument to ensure that confounding factors are not
driving our results. The important results are presented in panels A-D of table 7. We do not have
complete and reliable information on the birth years of CEO children. A potential source of bias
may arise from the fact the daughters were born after the CEO completed his tenure, and therefore
are unlikely to have a¤ected his choice. Given the median CEO in our sample is 58.9 years, it is
uncommon for a CEO in our sample to have a daughter during, or after his tenure. To attenuate
this concern, we restrict our sample to CEOs who are over 45 years and are not from the founding
family. These restrictions do not alter our baseline results (panel A).
Another concern with using the gender of children is that the CEO could have used a fertility
stopping rule, which can potentially violate the exogeneity of the gender composition of his children.
It has been proposed that the gender of the rst-born child is a more exogenous gender measure
(Washington, 2008; Cronqvist and Yu, 2017). In a sub-sample of our CEO children data, we can
identify the ordering of the children. Of the 255 CEOs for whom we have information on children,
we know the order of birth for the children on 193 CEOs. In column 1 of panel B, we test for
potential fertility stopping rules. We regress the number of CEO children after the rst child on an
indicator of whether the rst child was a daughter. A fertility stopping rule will imply a positive
association, whereby parents continue to have children after they have a daughter if they prefer
sons. The coe¢ cient is -0.09, and statistically insignicant at conventional levels. Therefore we
nd no evidence of CEOs using fertility stopping rules.
15 In unreported results, we investigate possible mechanisms through which female representation can a¤ect rm
performance. Specically, we examine the e¤ect of female board representation on total CEO pay and fraction of the
variable pay. We do not nd any e¤ect of female representation on total CEO pay, but female representation seems
to be associated with higher proportion of variable pay.
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Next, we regress Proportion of Female on Board on the indicator for whether the rst born
child was a daughter. The results are presented in column 2 of panel B, with the full set of control
variables. The coe¢ cient is 0.219 and is statistically signicant. This coe¢ cient is similar that of
our rst stage IV estimates as presented in column 1 of appendix C. Therefore it does not seem
that the birth order of the CEOs children a¤ects our central results.
CEOs preferences for female appointment to boards or societal equity can be a¤ected by par-
enting a daughter, or parenting a child irrespective of the gender. For example, if a CEO parents
both daughters and sons, any discrimination in the labour market may be more visible to them in
relative terms, or parenthood generally could increase prosocial views. We seek to examine this in
two ways. First, in column 1 of panel C, we use an indicator, which is 1 if the CEO has a child of
any gender. The coe¢ cient is positive and statistically signicant at 1% levels. However, the child
e¤ectsubsumes any daughter e¤ect, as a result, this is not a clean test. In column 2, we include
an indicator for CEO Son, in addition to the indicator for CEO Daughter. Whilst the coe¢ cient
on CEO Son indicator is positive, it is not statistically signicant at standard levels. The e¤ect
of daughter remains qualitatively similar to our baseline results. Therefore it does not seem that
having a son a¤ects the CEOs preference for appointing female directors, and the children-e¤ect in
column 1 is driven by the daughter-e¤ect.
[Insert Table 7 near here]
It can be argued that healthier and more productive CEOs could be more fertile, and this
could impact positively on rm performance. If that is the case, CEOs with larger families are
statistically more likely to have daughters, compared to CEOs with a smaller family. 8.80% of our
sample CEOs have one child, 47.33% have two children, 31.36% have three children, 6.46% have
four children, and the rest have more than four children. In panel D, we control for the number
of CEO children in the baseline rst-stage IV regressions. The coe¢ cient on the number of CEO
children is 0.113 and is not statistically signicant at standard levels. The CEO daughter coe¢ cient
remains unchanged, and retains its statistical signicance. It does not appear that CEO family size
poses a signicant concern to our instrumental variable strategy.
In column 2 of panel D, we estimate the e¤ect of 2.7% of our sample CEOs who do not have any
children. The CEO daughter e¤ect on female director appointment remains qualitatively similar,
and the estimated coe¢ cient on the indicator for CEO with no children is not statistically signicant
at 10% levels.
One concern with using news-based information is that the current CEOs will be over-represented
in the media, compared to previous CEOs. This may induce bias in the identication of the gender
of CEO children. However, we have been able to identify the gender composition of 88.23% of cur-
rent CEOs and 90.98% of former CEOschildren. The di¤erence in the mean number of daughters
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parented by current and former CEOs in 0.02, and is not statistically signicant. Therefore, this
type of survivor bias in the sample does not seem to be a major concern for our analysis.16
Could existing female directors inuence the choice of CEOs, and in particular, the probability
of hiring a CEO with a daughter? We estimated models where the main coe¢ cient of interest was
the proportion of female on board prior to the turnover event, the dependent variable was incoming
CEO has a daughter, and the other explanatory variables largely follow appendix C. We found no
evidence that existing gender diversity on the board inuences the probability of hiring a CEO
with a daughter.
More broadly, we investigate whether board gender diversity a¤ects the appointment of CEOs.
While several studies show that internal candidates have a higher likelihood of being appointed
as the CEO as they are more likely to continue with rms current policies than outside CEOs
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Parrino, 1997; Helmich and Brown, 1972). Markets view the ap-
pointment of CEOs from outside the rm more favourably than internal promotions (Borokhovich,
Parrino, and Trapani, 1996). We classify CEO appointments as "Outside" if the new CEO has
been employed in the rm for less than 2 years at the time of appointment as the CEO. This
classication results in 34% outside CEO appointments within our sample. In the remaining cases,
an internal candidate is appointed as the CEO. Among this 34%, about two-thirds of the CEO
join the rm at the time of succession. We found no statistically signicant e¤ects of female board
representation on the likelihood of outside CEO appointments.17
A more general concern is that our baseline models with rm xed e¤ects are identied by events
of CEO turnover, which are often preceded by poor rm performance, or a shock to protability
(Kaplan and Minton, 2012; Gregory-Smith et al, 2009). Therefore, the positive association between
female representation and ROA can reect the reversion of performance to the mean after the
appointment of the new CEO. To examine this issue we restrict our sample to rms which experience
at least one event of CEO turnover within the sample period. This allows us to examine the
performance e¤ect of female representation within a set where mean reversion is equally likely for
all rms. We present the OLS, FE, and IV results in table 8. The IV estimates for these rms
compare the e¤ects of changes in gender board/committee composition on rm performance for
rms treatedby CEOs with daughters relative to rms with CEOs with only sons, or no children.
The results are qualitatively similar to our baseline results. This attenuates the concern that our
results are solely driven by reversion to mean performance around events of CEO turnover.
[Table 8 around here]
16An alternate strategy could be to consider how growing up with sisters a¤ects male attitudes (Healy and Malhotra,
2013). However, we were only able to gain information on CEOssiblings for 94 CEOs (37%). We used this information
to estimate rst stage IV regressions with a dummy for CEO has a sister. CEO with a sister has a positive e¤ect
on female board and committee female representation. These e¤ects are sizeable but imprecise: 0.176 [s.e. 0.113] for
boards; 0.168 [s.e. 0.106] for committees.
17These results are not presented in the interests of brevity and are available on request.
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Our identication strategy relies on the gender of his child inuencing social preferences of the
CEO. It is plausible that these preferences manifest themselves not only in the appointment of
female directors to committees but also in other aspects that a¤ect rm outcomes. For example,
Cronqvist and Yu (2017) present evidence that suggests that rms with CEOs parenting a daughter
spend more on CSR. Dahl, Deszö, Ross (2012) show that male CEOs pay employees slightly less
after fathering a child. Most relevant to us, they present evidence that fathering a daughter
increases employee wages, particularly those of women. In both cases (CSR and increased female
pay) this is likely to increases rm costs, and reduce prots in the short run. This will lead to a
conservative bias towards zero for our main variable of interest. Nevertheless, this raises general
concerns regarding the validity of our exclusion restriction. Whilst ruling out all alternate channels
through which parenting a daughter can a¤ect the CEOs choices is di¢ cult, we conduct a range of
tests aimed at attenuating these concerns. First, we examine if parenting a daughter a¤ects other
rm outcomes directly. In particular, we test if parenting a daughter increases the planning horizon
of the CEO and/or makes the CEO more risk-averse. To do so, we rst use two standard measures
of the planning horizon: capital expenditure (CapEx); and research and development expenditure
(R&D). We then focus on two measures of the riskiness of the rms position: debt-to-capital ratio
(DC Ratio); and the debt-to-equity ratio (DE Ratio). Table 9 provides reduced-form estimates of
the e¤ect of CEOs with a daughter on these outcomes. There appears to be no association between
our instrument and these rm outcomes.
[Table 9 around here]
Next, CEOs with daughters could enact female-friendly policies that improve the productivity
of the workforce, which in turn improves rm performance. This e¤ect is likely to be stronger
in sectors where the share of women in the workforce is higher. We do not observe the share of
female workers for individual rms in our sample. Instead, we base our analysis on the share of
women in employment across industry-groups from Christiansen et al. (2016) and Do, Levchenko
and Raddatz (2016) using data from OECD annual labour force statistics. The average share of
women in the industry-groups of our sample rms is 38%. This is lower than the EU average of
female labour force participation as some of the sectors with a high proportion of women are not
represented in our sample. We estimate our baseline specication for subsamples of rms where
the share of women in the workforce is above and below 40%. We nd the e¤ect of CEO-daughters
on female committee representation is similar for both subsamples, as are the performance e¤ects
of female representation. Therefore, it does not seem that our results are driven by unobserved
factors that the CEO might inuence in rms where the share of women in the workforce is large.
Further, CEOs with daughters can implement strategies that attract more female customers.
This e¤ect, we argue, is likely to be stronger when the rm is selling a nal product, rather than
an intermediate product. Therefore, we estimate our baseline specications for subsamples of rms
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that sell nal products/services and rms that sell intermediate products. Once again, we nd
the e¤ect of CEO-daughters on female committee representation is similar for both subsamples, as
are the performance e¤ects of female representation. In these subsample analyses, the associations
of CEO-Daughter with female board and committee representation are similar to the baseline
specications, although in some of the subsamples the tests are of low power reecting small sample
sizes. Nevertheless, these results partially attenuate concerns about the exclusion restriction. These
results are presented in panels A and B of online appendix I respectively.
5.2.2 Additional robustness tests
We conduct a range of furthers tests aimed at ensuring the robustness of our baseline results.
First, we use an alternative identication strategy where we examine the market reaction of board
appointment of female directors, and assignment to committees. Using data on the date of an-
nouncement of director appointments from BoardEx, we conduct an event study to examine how
investors react to female director appointments on the board. This empirical design controls for
any rm-specic e¤ects in female director appointments. We use announcement date of director
appointments from EuroTop 100 rms within our sample period. Appointments are excluded if the
announcement date is not available, or overlaps with other major corporate announcements. This
yields a sample of 321 female director appointments, and 334 other director appointments.18
We calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around the announcement date for 3-
day and 7-day windows, and regress the CARs on the Female indicator, with rm and industry
controls. On average, there are no statistically signicant announcement e¤ects for female director
appointments to boards for both 3-day and 7-day windows.19 Further, we investigate the subset of
female director appointments for which committee assignments are simultaneously announced. This
reduces our sample to 210 female director and 228 male director appointments. While positive,
the announcement e¤ect of female board appointment is not statistically signicant. However,
the announcement of the assignment of a female director to a key committee is associated with a
positive and statistically signicant price reaction. The results are presented in table 10.
[Table 10 around here]
To what extent do our novel results simply reect a di¤erent institutional setting? Our data
allows us to address this by attempting to reconcile our results with those existing for the UK. We
18 It is possible that female directors are appointed to replace existing female directors (Gregory-Smith et al., 2014).
If that is the case, then the second announcement of appointing a female director may not add to the stock of female
directors. In our analysis, we only use additions: announcements where the count of female directors on the board
increases from 1 to 2.
19We use information from the Announcement Date eld of BoardEx, and check for the robustness of our results
using E¤ective Date. The results are similar in magnitude and signicance.
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report the estimates with rm xed e¤ects separately for the subsample of UK rms. We provide
xed e¤ects and instrumental variable regression results for both Proportion of Female on Board,
and Proportion of Female in Committees in table 11. This exercise provides some interesting
insights. First, the e¤ect on the rm performance of the proportion of female directors on the
board for the UK sub-sample is not statistically signicant at conventional levels. This is consistent
with the results of Gregory-Smith et al (2014) that there are no performance gains for UK rms
from board gender diversity. Second, the e¤ect on rm performance of the proportion of female
directors on board committees for the UK sub-sample is both positive and statistically signicant.
These results suggest that full economic benets of female representation could be internalized by
integrating directors through committee appointments. This reinforces our previous point that the
traditional measures of board gender diversity do not reect the degree of integration of the female
directors in the governance mechanism.
[Table 11 around here]
More generally, our data are drawn from large rms across di¤erent European countries that
di¤er in their governance regimes. Our baseline specications are estimated with rm xed e¤ects
which partially mitigates this insofar as all rms are nested within countries. However, these coun-
tries vary in the composition and the functioning of the board (for example, German and Dutch
rms have two-tiered boards), and may also vary in how committees function. We examine two
variations in governance settings which appear particularly likely to be relevant. First, compen-
sation committees are likely to function in a substantially di¤erent way in countries with binding
Say on Pay (SoP) legislation compared to countries with advisory say on pay (footnote here what
this means and which countries). Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden have binding SoP
legislations. We estimate our baseline specications for the subsample of rms in countries with
binding SoP and subsample of rms with advisory SoP. The results, presented in panel A of online
appendix II, suggests that the performance e¤ects of female board and committee representation
are essentially the same for rms in both the subsamples. Second, we split the sample into subsam-
ples of rms with two-tier boards and one-tier boards. We nd similar e¤ects of female board and
committee representations on rm performance. These results are presented in panel B of online
appendix II, and show that our results hold across di¤erent board and committee regulations across
European countries.
A further concern is the variation of governance regulations within countries over time. Our
baseline specications are estimated with year dummies which absorb some of the variations across
time at the rm level. However, this may miss country-specic changes over time. To investigate
this we estimate our baseline specications with country-specic linear time trends. The results
presented in panel A of online appendix III are qualitatively similar to that of the main results.
The magnitude of the performance e¤ect of female representation is smaller compared to the base-
line results. The performance e¤ect of female representation on boards could also vary over time.
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For example, the implementation of board gender quotas in Norway may have changed the nor-
mative expectation of female representation on corporate boards in other countries. We examine
the relative performance e¤ects of female representation before and after the year 2008 when the
Norwegian board gender quotas were implemented. The results are presented in panel B of online
appendix III. We nd stronger e¤ect of female board representation on rm performance in the
post-2008 period, and comparable performance e¤ects of female committee representation in both
the periods.20
The results of the subsample analyses are reported from rm-xed e¤ects regressions. This
is due to low power on the two-stage IV estimates for each subsample. In online appendix V,
we present the rst-stage estimates of the e¤ect of CEO daughter on female representation in
committees for each of the subsamples discussed above. We nd a positive association of our IV
with the proportion of female directors on committees, albeit with varying statistical signicance.
These results provide support to our empirical strategy insofar as they are indicative of CEOs with
daughters broadly leading to greater female board representation across a range of institutional
settings.
We compare the performance e¤ects of female representation using di¤erent measures of rm
performance in online appendix V. The results are qualitatively similar for all the measures of rm
performance.
Next, we present our results when we rely upon an instrumental variable previously used in the
literature: the fraction of male directors on the board of rm i who sit on other boards (rms other
than i) with at least one female director (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Gregory-Smith et al. 2014).
The argument is that if male directors of the board of rm i have exposure to other boards with
female directors, then they are more likely to appoint female directors to their own board. However,
this should not impact upon rm performance, except through the appointment of female directors
on the board. Similarly, we attempt to control for endogeneity in the committee appointments by
using the proportion of male members who sit on other boards with at least one female committee
member. The results, presented in online appendix VI, are qualitatively similar to our baseline
estimates. However, using this instrument the magnitude of the performance impact of female
representation is much larger than our preferred estimates.
In online appendix VII we present estimates where our measure of female representation is a
binary indicator of at least one female director on the board. This is both a standard measure
used in the literature (Adams and Ferreira, 2009) but the interpretation ts with current estimates
of gender diversity in settings with very low levels of female representation. The coe¢ cient on
the binary indicator is negative. This suggests that the appointment of the rst female director
does not enhance rm performance. When combined with our main results this provides suggestive
20 In separate specications, we also estimate our baseline specications with industry-year xed e¤ects. Our main
results are una¤ected by this.
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evidence that the benets of female representation may only appear with more than one female
director. Schwartz-Ziv (2015) nd that boards with a minimum of three female directors are more
active at board meetings than those without such representation. We follow a similar approach
in our xed e¤ects setting to examine the role of critical mass. Consistent with the critical mass
hypothesis, we nd that the presence of at least three female directors is associated with a positive
e¤ect on rm performance. Further, rms with at least 50% female directors on the committees
seem to have stronger performance e¤ects than rms that do not have such representation.
In the baseline specication, Proportion of Female in Committees is calculated as the proportion
of female directors to the total number of director on committees. We use an alternate measure:
the proportion of female in committees, conditional on being on the board. We nd a stronger
association between female committee membership and rm performance.21
An array of additional tests were done to ensure the robustness of the results with respect to
sample selection, di¤erent specications of the variables and the models. First, we test our baseline
xed e¤ects specications with a larger sample of European rms. The results are qualitatively
similar to the baseline specications. Second, we test the robustness of our results with alternate
measures of rm performance and rm size. The estimates of Proportion of Female on Board,
and Proportion of Female in Committees are qualitatively similar to the baseline estimates. We
estimated GMM models of our baseline specications, using Arellano-Bond two-stage method to
control for potential endogeneity in rm performance and female director appointments. Again,
neither of these checks undermine our baseline results. Finally, we examined whether the impact
of female representation is heterogeneous across industries. We do this by splitting our sample by
broad industry classication (services and manufacturing), the resulting estimates of Proportion
of Female on Board and Proportion of Female in Committees are qualitatively similar for both
sub-groups. Our results also stand when we include industry-time xed e¤ects to our baseline
specications.
In summary, the results of the performance impact on the rm performance of female represen-
tation are di¤erent from that of the existing evidence. This is possibly due to higher participation of
female directors in the governance mechanism through their presence on the key committees. The
UK and US evidence shows the impact of having (a few) female directors on the board compared
to none, whereas we provide evidence of having an involved role of female directors, and appointing
them in key committees to inuence governance, and performance. Together, these results support
our central hypothesis that rms benet from female director appointments, only when they are
integrated into the governance mechanism.
21We also construct other measures of diversity using the nationalities of independent directors, irrespective of
their gender. We nd a weak positive association of director nationality on rm performance. However, we nd no
statistically signicant CEO/daughter e¤ect on the appointment of directors of other nationalities.
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6 Conclusion
Greater gender diversity in corporate decision making is a central theme of current governance
regulations. Current research that focuses on gender diversity on corporate boards nd no, or
even a negative, e¤ect of female board representation on rm protability. This lack of economic
benets from female board representation means that any case for greater gender diversity needs
to be structured around arguments for equity and moral justice. We return to this issue in the
setting of large listed European rms where the level of female board representation is higher than
that of the US and the UK.
The innovation of this paper is twofold. Existing research has focused on the e¤ect of rep-
resentation on corporate boards. While a prerequisite for involvement in rm decision making,
board representation does not guarantee it. We seek to more closely proxy involvement in decision
making by focusing on gender diversity on key board committees. Specically, we investigate the
e¤ect of the assignment of female directors to three important board committees on rm perfor-
mance. Directors on audit, nomination, and compensation committees can directly inuence the
core functions of corporate governance, and through that rm performance. Our second innovation
is to adopt an identication strategy which we believe gets us closer to the causal e¤ect of gender
diversity on rm performance. We use the observation that the gender composition of children
inuences parental preferences. With this in mind, we use whether the CEO has a daughter as a
source of exogenous variation in the probability of female representation on the rms board and
committees. We demonstrate that hiring a CEO who has a daughter has sizeable e¤ects on board
gender diversity. While not the focus of this paper this is an important nding in and of itself as
it provides further evidence on the potential e¤ects of exposure to diversity on (male) preferences
and behaviour.
We demonstrate modest but economically meaningful e¤ects of female board representation
on rm performance. These e¤ects are markedly larger for committee membership. Whilst these
e¤ects are modest, our results provide evidence that greater female representation, especially when
integrated more closely into the governance mechanism, increases rm protability. These results
are important as they provide an economic basis for increased gender diversity. They also suggest
that regulatory e¤orts focused solely on increased board representation are unlikely to unlock the
full benets of gender diversity in corporate decision making. Future research that identied the
causal mechanisms through which gender diversity improves rm performance would further tighten
the focus of these regulations.
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N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Firm Characteristics
Return on Assets (ROA) 1,582 6.643 6.108 -09.28 38.95
Ln Sales 1,582 17.558 0.921 14.39 20.02
Market-to-Book Value (MTBV) 1,582 2.866 5.792 -58.37 86.00
Stock Price Volatility 1,582 0.939 0.913 0.05 9.44
HHI 1,582 0.212 0.329 0.095 0.608
Capital Expenditure (/Sales) 1,517 0.457 0.339 0.103 0.716
R&D (/Sales) 1,470 0.116 0.423 0.004 0.502
Debt-to-Capital Ratio (DC Ratio) 1,580 0.1233 0.5077 2.478 21.516
Debt-to-Equity Ratio (DE Ratio) 1,580 0.0422 0.0265 0.0180 0.0624
Board Characteristics
Board Size 1,582 16.963 5.942 6.00 36.00
Proportion Independent Directors 1,582 0.477 0.278 0.00 0.910
Chairman-CEO 1,582 0.154 0.228 0.00 1.00
Firm has Female Directors 1,582 0.911 0.285 0.00 1.00
Firm has One Female Director 1,582 0.175 0.379 0.00 1.00
Proportion of Female on Board 1,582 0.185 0.145 0.00 0.889
Proportion of Female in Committees 1,582 0.152 0.162 0.00 0.602
Nomination Committee Size 1,582 3.941 2.473 0.00 16.00
Audit Committee Size 1,582 4.208 1.461 0.00 8.00
Compensation Committee Size 1,582 3.432 1.949 0.00 9.00
Director Characteristics
No. of CEO daughters 255 1.147 1.912 0.00 4.00
Time on Board 16,647 5.756 5.269 0.00 54.90
Time in Role 16,647 4.535 4.238 0.00 47.72
Ph.D. 16,647 0.091 0.343 0.00 1.00
CFA 16,647 0.114 0.436 0.00 1.00
Other Directorships (Listed Firms) 16,647 0.880 1.744 0.00 9.00
Previous Experience in Committees 16,647 0.125 0.404 0.00 1.00
Executive Age (years) 16,647 58.115 8.097 26.00 90.00
Notes: See Appendix A for variable denitions.
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Table 2
Comparisons of rms with and without at least one female director
No Female At Least One p-value
Directors mean Female Director-Mean
Ln Sales 15.296 17.614 0.272
MTBV 3.025 2.819 0.000
ROA 5.869 6.697 0.000
HHI 0.208 0.213 0.000
Board Size 15.140 17.152 0.072
Proportion Independent Directors 0.471 0.478 0.110
Executive Age 59.035 58.013 0.000
Nomination Committee Size 3.849 3.950 0.066
Audit Committee Size 3.283 4.308 0.000
Compensation Committee Size 3.541 3.420 0.010
Note: This table presents key summary statistics for rm-years with no female




Distribution of CEO children and daughters








Note: The modal CEO has 2 children and one daughter.
These counts include both adopted and biological children.
Table 4
Comparisons of rms with and without the CEOs parenting a daughter
Variable No Daughters At Least One Daughter p-value
Mean Mean
Any Female 0.85 0.94 0.001**
Proportion of Female on Board 0.170 0.198 0.000***
Proportion of Female in Committees 0.122 0.184 0.000***
Ln Sales 17.21 17.22 0.218
Board Size 16.11 16.20 0.292
Proportion of Independent Directors 0.471 0.471 0.212
CEO Turnover 0.12 0.09 0.209
Executive Age 59.14 59.22 0.231
Nomination Committee Size 3.91 3.88 0.303
Audit Committee Size 4.30 4.07 0.197
Compensation Committee Size 3.42 3.55 0.229
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the rm level. ***,**, and * denotes statistical
signicance at1 %, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
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Table 5
Female directors and rm performance (ROA)
Dependent variable: Return on Assets
Panel A Panel B
OLS FE IV OLS FE IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Proportion of Female 0.023*** 0.005*** 0.011***
on Boardit 1 (0.005) (0.001) (0.003)
Proportion of Female in 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.023***
Committeesit 1 (0.006) (0.002) (0.007)
Ln Salesit 1 0.300*** 0.033*** 0.050*** 0.419*** 0.031** 0.040**
(0.049) (0.007) (0.023) (0.049) (0.015) (0.020)
Stock Price -0.206*** 0.000 -0.003 -0.216*** -0.205 -0.221
Volatilityt 1 (0.007) (0.026) (0.003) (0.065) (0.169) (0.169)
Board Sizeit 1 -0.472*** -0.015** -0.031* -0.479*** -0.408* -0.423*
(0.010) (0.008) (0.016) (0.010) (0.209) (0.216)
Proportion of -0.064** 0.081*** 0.077* 0.064*** 0.062** 0.050**
Independent Directorsit 1 (0.002) (0.015) (0.035) (0.002) (0.002) (0.017)
Ph.Dsit 1 0.023 0.009 0.000 0.011 0.002 0.001
(0.033) (0.012) (0.004) (0.017) (0.005) (0.005)
CFAsit 1 0.018 0.016 0.011 0.022 0.020 0.015
(0.014) (0.012) (0.006) (0.018) (0.014) (0.008)
Previous Committee 0.019*** 0.012*** 0.006* 0.028*** 0.025** 0.024**
Experienceit 1 (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012)
Other Directorshipsit 1 0.009 0.007 0.000 0.004 0.003 0.003
(0.008) (0.005) (0.002) (0.009) (0.004) (0.003)
HHI -0.013** 0.005 0.003 -0.011* 0.003 0.002
(0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002)
Constant 26.98*** 28.03*** 33.10** 30.052*** 29.18*** 24.66***
(0.898) (0.927) (3.987) (0.894) (0.999) (4.41)
Firm xed e¤ects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 1,582 1,582 1,582 1,582 1,582 1,530
First Stage F   Stat 14.15 22.66
R2 0.255 0.208 0.220 0.201 0.211 0.250
Notes: We present results for two meaures of representation: Proportion of Females on
the Board (panel A) and Proportion of Female in Committees (panel B). Within each pan
-el, we present OLS results, estimates with rm-xed e¤ects, and IV estimates with an
indicator for the CEO parenting a daughter as the instrument. Robust standard errors,
clustered at the rm level are in the parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at 1%
5% and 10% levels respectively.
33
Table 6
Female directors and rm performance (MTBV )
Dependent variable: MTBV
Panel A Panel B
OLS FE IV OLS FE IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Proportion of Female 0.019*** 0.007*** 0.022***
on Boardit 1 (0.004) (0.002) (0.006)
Proportion of Female in 0.020*** 0.025*** 0.044***
Committeesit 1 (0.006) (0.004) (0.009)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 19.67*** 22.45*** 24.77*** 26.50*** 28.71*** 26.37***
(0.670) (1.241) (4.008) (0.765) (1.318) (4.424)
Firm xed e¤ects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 1,582 1,582 1,582 1,582 1,582 1,530
First Stage F   Stat 14.15 22.66
R2 0.249 0.236 0.257 0.194 0.229 0.273
Notes: We present results for two meaures of representation: Proportion of Females on
the Board (panel A) and Proportion of Female in Committees (panel B). Within each pan
-el, we present OLS results, estimates with rm-xed e¤ects, and IV estimates with an
indicator for the CEO parenting a daughter as the instrument. Robust standard errors,
clustered at the rm level are in the parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at 1%




Panel A: Age of CEO Daughters (CEO age  45 and non-family CEOs)
Proportion of Female on Board Proportion of Female in Committees
(1) (2)
CEO daughter 0.213*** 0.220***
(0.062) (0.066)
Firm characteristics Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes
Firm xed e¤ects Yes Yes
Panel B: Fertility Stopping Rules and First Born E¤ect
No. of CEO children after rst child Proportion of Female on Board
(1) (2)
First born CEO daughter -0.090 0.219***
(0.165) (0.061)
Firm characteristics Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes
Firm xed e¤ects Yes Yes
Panel C: Daughter E¤ect vs Children E¤ect








Firm characteristics Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes
Firm xed e¤ects Yes Yes
Panel D: Family Size E¤ect
Proportion of Female on Board
(1) (2)
CEO daughter 0.216*** 0.219***
(0.066) (0.059)
No. of CEO children 0.113
(0.071)
CEO with no children 0.022
(0.055)
Firm characteristics Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes
Firm xed e¤ects Yes Yes
Notes: Panel A presents the results for subsample of non-family CEOs over 45 years of age, panel
B reports tests for fertility stopping rules, and the rst-born e¤ect, panel C presents results of tests
for daughter vs. children e¤ect, and panel D presents results for family size e¤ects.
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Table 8
Female directors, rm performance, and mean reversion
Dependent variable: Return on Assets
Panel A Panel B
OLS FE IV OLS FE IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Proportion of Female 0.019** 0.007** 0.009***
on Boardit 1 (0.008) (0.003) (0.002)
Proportion of Female 0.017** 0.012** 0.015***
in Committeesit 1 (0.007) (0.006) (0.004)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 21.45*** 24.33*** 25.09*** 26.50*** 28.71*** 26.37***
(1.343) (0.998) (5.656) (2.201) (2.042) (5.939)
Firm xed e¤ects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 1,120 1,120 1,120 1,120 1,120 1,120
First Stage F   Stat 14.06 20.25
R2 0.238 0.212 0.210 0.194 0.198 0.215
Notes: We test for possible confounding e¤ects of mean-reversion in rm performance foll
-llowing CEO turnover. We restrict our sample to rms which has a change in CEO over
the sample period. We present OLS, FE and IV results for the e¤ect of proportion of female
-s on board (Panel A) and on committees (Panel B) on ROA. Robust standard errors cluste




CEOs with daughters and other rm outcomes
Dependent Variable CapEX R&D DC Ratio DE Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CEO Daughter 0.044 0.018 0.003 0.012
(0.035) (0.012) (0.002) (0.009)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 3.604*** 4.418*** 2.055*** 3.334***
(0.320) (0.802) (0.709) (0.501)
Observations 1,517 1,470 1,580 1,580
R2 0.214 0.193 0.318 0.329
Notes: We examine two possible channels: planning horizon
(CapEx and R&D) and rm risk (Debt to Capital and Debt to
Equity ratios. Robust standard errors are in brackets. *, **,




Female director announcement returns
CAR (-1, +1) CAR (-3 +3) CAR (-1, +1) CAR (-3, +3)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female on Board 0.058 0.031
(0.044) (0.025)
Female in Committees 0.031*** 0.024**
(0.011) (0.012)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.199 0.182 0.210 0.161
Notes: This table presents market model adjusted announcement returns for app
-ointment of a random sample of 500 female directors and 500 other independen
-t non-executive directors. Appointments are excluded if the announcement date
is not available, or overlaps with other major corporate announcements, resulting
in a sample of 321 female-, and 334 other director appointments. The abnormal
returns presented here are over 3-day and 7-day event windows. Columns (1)
and (2) show that the results for appointment of female directors to boards and
columns columns (3) and (4) show results for 210 events of concurrent announce
-ment of female director appointments to committees. All specications include
full set of control variables with year and industry dummies. ***, **, and * indicate
signicance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
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Table 11
Female directors and rm performance: UK sub-samples
Dependent Variable: Return on Assets
Fixed E¤ects Instrumental Variable
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Proportion of Female 0.007 0.008
on Boardit 1 (0.004) (0.006)
Proportion of Female 0.011** 0.006**
in Committeesit 1 (0.005) (0.003)
Constant 26.18*** 26.09*** 20.02*** 18.66***
(1.609) (1.621) (0.018) (0.056)
Firm xed e¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 493 493 493 493
R2 0.282 0.261 0.197 0.169
Notes: This table presents the results of the performance impact of board gen
-der diversity for a sub-sample of UK rms from the Eurotop100. Robust stand
-ard errors clustered at the rm level reported in the parentheses. ***, ** , and *









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Comparison of our sample with other indices
Attributes EuroTop100 FTSEurorst FTSE 350 S&P 500
300
Number of Constituents 100 318 351 506
Average Mkt Cap (US$ Mn) 40,434 21,430 8,375 40,838
Dividend Yield % 3.89 3.60 3.54 2.12
Weight of Largest Constituent 3.70 3.61 5.81 3.25
Top 10 holdings (% of Index) 25.68 24.94 36.43 21.28
Proportion of Female on Board 18.531 16.302 10.544 9.843
Proportion of Female in Committees 15.200 14.877 14.224 12.682
Notes: This table presents the comparison of our sample with FTSEurorst300, FTSE
350 and S&P 500 rms. Our sample from EuroTop100 index is similar to the other indices
in terms of market capitalisation, dividend yield, weights of top 10 holdings etc.
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Appendix C
First-stage instrumental variable regressions
Dependent Variable
Proportion of Female on Boardt Proportion of Female in Committeest
(1) (2)
CEO daughter 0.207*** 0.219***
(0.055) (0.046)
Ln Salesit 1 0.322** 0.269**
(0.164) (0.126)
Stock Price 0.070 0.081
Volatilityit 1 (0.064) (0.059)
Board Sizeit 1 0.075** 0.061
(0.043) (0.052)
Proportion of Indepen 0.051 0.066**





Previous Committee 0.089*** 0.236***
Experienceit 1 (0.020) (0.071)






Firm xed e¤ects Yes Yes




Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the rm level are in the parentheses. ***, **, and *
indicate signicance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Appendix D
Assignment of female directors on board committees
Dependent Variable
Any Audit Nomination Compensation
Committee Committee Committee Committee
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female 0.098** 0.096*** -0.019** 0.001
(0.044) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Female* Ph.D. 0.067 0.079 0.028 0.059
(0.039) (0.070) (0.022) (0.043)
Female* CFA 0.055 0.041** 0.009 0.044
(0.029) (0.020) (0.015) (0.036)
Female* Previous 0.033** 0.017** 0.040*** 0.028**
Committee Experience (0.014) (0.008) (0.016) (0.013)
Ph.D. 0.113 0.145 0.108 0.100
(0.277) (0.212) (0.093) (0.122)
CFA 0.159** 0.212*** 0.127 0.124**
(0.070) (0.056) (0.088) (0.061)
Previous Commitee 0.243*** 0.281*** 0.208** 0.221***
Experience (0.081) (0.075) (0.102) (0.094)
Other Directorships 0.012 0.008 0.019 0.014
(0.022) (0.006) (0.013) (0.025)
Chairman-CEO 0.215 0.232 0.188 0.200
(0.187) (0.222) (0.165) (0.183)
Time in Role -0.0011 -0.001 -.000 -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln Age 0.010*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.0004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Board Sizet 1 -0.018*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.012***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Proportion of Female 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001**
on Boardt 1 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Proportion of Indepen 0.000 -0.0007*** 0.000 0.004**
-dent Directorsit 1 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROAit 1 0.000 -0.000 -0.001** -0.002**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln Salesit 1 -0.024** -0.013** -0.029*** -0.021**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Stock Price 0.002*** 0.000 0.001** -0.000
Volatilityit 1 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
HHI 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of 1,136 665 471 427
female directors
Observations 16,647 15,246 14,937 15,132
R2 0.308 0.267 0.195 0.222
Notes: All estimates are from linear probability models with rm xed e¤ects. Robust
standard errors clustered at the rm levels are in the parentheses. ***, **, and * indic
-ate signicance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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